THE POLITICS OF SELLING RICE

THE POLITICS OF SELLING RICE

When President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (PBBM) made the bold promise to bring down the price of rice to ₱20 per kilo, many Filipinos saw it as an ambitious yet hopeful campaign pledge. As both President and concurrent Secretary of Agriculture at the time, it was assumed that he had a well-studied strategy rooted in systemic reforms—perhaps one that addressed the inefficiencies in rice production, post-harvest losses, and middleman-dominated supply chains. The public expected a comprehensive, long-term agricultural development plan that would empower farmers while ultimately lowering consumer prices.

Unfortunately, what has materialized thus far appears to be a short-term, politically convenient solution: subsidizing rice to sell it at lower retail prices despite high production and procurement costs. It seems that the government, through agencies such as the National Food Authority (NFA), buys rice at a relatively high wholesale price and sells it at a loss to achieve the promised price point. This approach may temporarily win public approval and provide relief to struggling consumers, but it is far from a sustainable economic policy.

Subsidies in agriculture are not inherently bad. Many countries support their farmers to protect food security and rural livelihoods. However, subsidies must be smartly targeted and time-bound, paired with structural reforms such as improving irrigation systems, providing access to affordable credit and quality seeds, investing in farm mechanization, and reducing logistics and post-harvest costs. Without these parallel reforms, subsidies become a band-aid solution—unsustainable in the long run and potentially harmful to the market.

What is troubling is that this subsidy-driven approach appears more political than economic. It creates the illusion of affordability while hiding the actual costs borne by the government and, ultimately, taxpayers. Worse, it could distort the rice market. Private traders might avoid competing with government-subsidized prices, leading to reduced investment in rice trading and distribution. Local farmers may also suffer if they are forced to sell palay (un-milled rice) at lower prices due to government-controlled market expectations, especially when input costs remain high.

Moreover, the continued reliance on rice importation—used to fill supply gaps and stabilize prices—hurts domestic producers. Instead of building rice self-sufficiency, the country becomes more dependent on global markets, vulnerable to price fluctuations and supply disruptions.

This situation highlights the intersection of agriculture and politics. Rice is not just a staple food in the Philippines—it is a politically sensitive commodity. Any rise in rice prices can quickly lead to public discontent. This is why administrations often prioritize short-term populist solutions over long-term agricultural investment. But these political calculations come at a cost: the neglect of meaningful agricultural reform, farmer welfare, and national food security.

In conclusion, while the intent to provide affordable rice is noble and politically strategic, the current approach under PBBM lacks sustainability. For the ₱20 rice promise to become reality—not just a populist slogan—what is needed is bold agricultural reform, not just subsidies. Only by strengthening local production, streamlining the supply chain, and empowering farmers can the dream of affordable, homegrown rice be realized—beyond politics, and for the long-term benefit of the nation.

Ramon Ike V. Seneres, www.facebook.com/ike.seneres
iseneres@yahoo.com, 09088877282, senseneres.blogspot.com

06-16-2025